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ABSTRACT
Discussions of global ethics--about the types of normative claim made on
groups and individuals (not only states), by groups and individuals around the world--
must move beyond the categories inherited in the International Relations discipline.
Many important positions are not captured by a framework developed for discussion of
inter-state relations. The blindspots seem to reflect an outmoded expectation that (i)
giving low normative weight to national boundaries correlates strongly with (ii) giving
more normative weight to people beyond one's national boundaries, and vice versa; in
other words that these two dimensions in practice reduce to one. The paper develops
and illustrates a considerably enriched categorization. We need to distinguish various
types of 'cosmopolitan' position, by recognizing the separate importance of the two di-
mensions; and to note and investigate many varieties of libertarian position which give
neither national boundaries nor pan-human obligations much (if any) importance.
11. INTRODUCTION
Global or world ethics is the study of ethical claims made on human beings --
individually or in groups, not only grouped as states -- in their relations with individu-
als and groups (again not only states) throughout the world (Dower, 1998). Nigel
Dower and others have highlighted as a new agenda this broadening of attention be-
yond states, in the context of the intensification of global interconnections and interna-
tionalizing of problems of absolute poverty, conflict, environment, refugees and more.2
This paper adopts the agenda, including for descriptive as well as normative
ethics, and argues first for wide-ranging description and analysis of existing ethics, in-
cluding practices as well as doctrines, and not only the elaboration, evaluation and ad-
vocacy of old or new formal doctrines. Section I suggests the importance of this sort of
sociology of ideas and practices, by reference to the growth of groups and persons who
have attenuated or no national loyalties and instead worldwide but not pan-human loy-
alties, and to debates about world free trade versus protecting established communities.
Attention to a wider range of actors, and to practices as well as doctrines, will
lead global ethics well beyond traditional normative IR with its focus on the relations
between states. The common expectation has been that positions which stress the nor-
mative importance of national boundaries will also put low weight on obligations that
cross national boundaries, in particular obligations on the basis of a common humanity;
and vice versa, low normative weight to national boundaries will go with higher weight
to global obligations. We will see that the expectation is misleading, and that a wider
range of positions must be investigated than normative IR conventionally considered,
including positions which give neither national boundaries nor pan-human global obli-
gations much ethical importance. Section II therefore considerably extends Dower’s
taxonomy of standpoints in world or global ethics.
Section III takes further the identification and clarification of these ‘neither-nor’
positions. They include enormously powerful anti-humanist stances, notably for unre-
stricted markets and even for unrestricted contestation as the principle for all spheres of
life. We will specify various such positions: in current responses to crises in the supply
of global public goods, in the reconsideration--and decline--of international aid in the
1980s, and in the Darwinian ‘ethics’ of those who will trade in anything. Section IV
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2then offers a set of conclusions and underlines the importance of descriptive ethics for
any realistic and effective practical ethics.
2. FROM SOCIAL CONTRACT TO MARKET CONTRACT
2.1 Ethical liberalization: liberation from obligation?
Namibia is an unusual country with a painful history. It has reportedly the high-
est Gini coefficient for income inequality in the world. Its large groups of settler whites,
both German and Afrikaner, enjoy exceptionally high average incomes, in what is oth-
erwise largely a country of poor people. This is a country with manifestly no integrated
national community. Many of the white Namibians in particular appear like a continu-
ing colonial group. In some ways they are long-term expatriates who require, in other
words demand, almost the same rewards as short-term expatriates plus greater rights
and opportunities than them -- and who are likely to emigrate when they no longer re-
ceive these. An extreme and minor case, surely?
Let us take a far larger case, at correspondingly greater length: a country with
almost a sixth of the world’s population, India. If one walks the streets of a metropolis
in India nowadays one can get a feeling that not only the rich but also increasing num-
bers of the professional classes have morally seceded from the nation. Many now seem
to live the same in certain ways as do Indian professional emigrants abroad, or foreign
tourists, or those same tourists when back home in the North. The smartly dressed well-
to-do proceed from gleaming cool office or home interiors, communicating to each
other on their cell phones, through streets with many wretched begging people whom
they generally ignore, to shops and hotels full of luxuries and imports from America,
Britain and Singapore for which they can evidently afford to pay close to world prices.
In the 1990s while consumerism reached new levels in India, public social sector ex-
penditures were squeezed. The affluent seem to have become semi-detached in their
own country, inhabitants of a quasi-apartheid system moving in the direction of Brazil
or South Africa. In effect they declare that if the elites and middle classes of other parts
of the globe are entitled to live in a certain way, then so are they - by the principle of
equal real income (post-taxation) for equal work.
What's new, one may ask? Was it ever different? Consider masses of Indians
starving in the streets of Calcutta in 1943 while grain was procured for war purposes, or
in the 1870s in the interior; or the Irish expiring en masse in the 1840s while grain was
exported and the society balls rolled on in Dublin and London. Were not the ruling and
3professional classes of those periods often international too, with investments and fam-
ily members spread across the world ? But after independence in India drastic mass
starvation was prevented, by timely public action. And while the failures to attend in
non-starvation times to the basic needs of up to half the population -- and the concomi-
tant evasion of taxation -- were a national, and global, scandal, the national community
appeared as a dominant image and aspiration. Indeed precisely on those grounds exter-
nal criticism was sometimes resisted: “You cannot criticize or share in policy discus-
sions about India if you are not a resident national, sharing these conditions, this des-
tiny, its joys and pains” -- a principle of, if not equal pay for equal work, then at least
equal voice only if equal pay.3
At least three shifts may have happened, in significant measure, in the past two
decades.
• The ethics have now been globalized, and liberalized: elites may comment on any-
thing, worldwide, but have been liberated from obligation. The principle has be-
come: “If we are obligated to the poor here in India [no longer ‘our poor’], then so
are you. Since you are not, then nor are we.”
• The professional and business elites in the South can now emigrate mentally rather
than physically, thanks to the intensity of trans-national communication and flows.
The software engineer in Chennai (Madras), Bangalore or Hyderabad employed di-
rectly or indirectly by a corporation in Europe or America can now live in many
ways almost the life of his emigrated classmate in the North.
• The vastly eased and intensified transnational contacts and flows -- messages, vis-
its, financial transfers -- allow even an average professional family of the new mil-
lennium to act as a global unit. Thus what made the Rothschilds unique and su-
preme in the early and mid 19th century is now mundane.
My main point is however not historical, not dependent on whether or not this
sort of stance is new or has grown; rather that such positions are widespread and sig-
nificant. India was already a country where group and family loyalties took precedence,
where condensation into a national entity was quite limited.
Huge numbers of course still emigrate physically - a high proportion of the best
Indian engineers, computer specialists, doctors, and scientists of every description:
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4sometimes even the majority of the output of elite training institutions paid for or heav-
ily supported with public funds as a subsidy to elite and upper middle class families.
Once abroad many remain in some ways mentally in India: in an émigré cocoon and
intensively connected home through telephones, e-mail, money transfers, visits in both
directions, etc. Many do return. Whether they return home, or stay home, may make
little difference to their loyalties: their life-norms are often largely the same as the émi-
grés. They typically want to work for the same corporations, acquire, consume, travel
and perhaps invest abroad, send their children there for studies and work. Often the ex-
tended families function as multi-national corporations: they are the project, more im-
portant as a machinery, base of identity and focus of investment than the nation. The
nation is still one base for their activities, but not predominant organizationally, let
alone normatively.
2.2 Economic liberalization versus national communities?
Many authors continue to assume that there is a national social contract, and
that the 16th-20th century condensation into national entities and largely territorially
(as opposed to functionally) based governance remains dominant.4 Let us take as an
example, the American economist Michael McKeever’s concluding piece in his widely
disseminated 2000-2001 series of Web essays on ‘Moral Economics’. It gave his views
on the debate on international trade liberalization.
MCKEEVER’S TEXT (at www.mkeever.com) COMMENTS
DUTY OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS
A responsible national government speaks for all the
people in its country; as such, it has the duty to protect its
vulnerable citizens from the harmful effects of free mar-
kets while taking advantage of the benefits they offer. In
practice, this means for example that domestic food mar-
kets should be protected from cheaper food imports if
domestic farmers will lose their livelihood and become
homeless job seekers migrating to cities. This protection
can take the form of tariffs, quotas or domestic content
requirements. This is justified because protecting families
from misery is a higher duty than protecting the rights of
business enterprise to make profits.
‘A responsible national govern-
ment’ is assumed to be responsible
to 1. ‘all the people in its country’;
not to 2. ‘the country’ as measured
by financial wealth, nor to 3. all
people in the world.
McKeever gives a formulation,
under which protection may be
permanent rather than temporary.
The families he (and his  ‘respon-
sible national government’) con-
siders are within the nation, not
worldwide.
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5In a broader sense, a responsible national government has
the duty to protect weaker portions of society from
stronger portions... [and] will take actions to provide la-
bor with some bargaining power so that power to deter-
mine wages and working conditions is more evenly di-
vided.
This proposal may rely on the ex-
istence of a feeling of national
community.
CONTROL CAPITAL
A major difficulty with this issue is that capital is free to
move from country to country in search of cheaper wages
while workers are less free to move to higher paying jobs;
a business owner can close his factory in a high wage
location and re-open in a low wage location, effectively
removing any bargaining power from workers in high
wage locations.
This argues that a responsible national government would
prevent capital from leaving the country to seek lower
wages; however, since competitive firms in other coun-
tries will seek lower wage costs, domestic firms will be
harmed by higher wage costs. The remedy is to protect
domestic companies that pay higher wages by enacting
tariffs, quotas and domestic content requirements. Such a
policy is in direct conflict with current trade agreements
that call for reduction or elimination of restraints on
trade. Again, such actions are justified because protecting
families from misery is a higher duty than protecting the
rights of business enterprise to make profits…..
Here McKeever seems mainly con-
cerned with the position of workers
in countries like the USA.
McKeever calls in effect for rejec-
tion of the liberal world economic
order.
This position is not cosmopolitan;
nor ‘internationalist’ in Dower’s
sense, insofar as it repudiates ex-
isting trade agreements.
McKeever pays no attention here
to the position of workers in other
countries, and their opportunities
to reduce their misery.
RESULTS OF INCOME AND WEALTH DISPARITIES
The growing imbalance between poor and rich people
will probably continue if current economic thinking con-
tinues. As the trend toward accumulating wealth by rich
people continues, the poor will have less and less; as a
result, they will lose hope of obtaining more than a sur-
vival pittance of material goods….
This part of McKeever’s projection
implicitly leads to disappearance
of the national community which
he still assumes to be present now.
It arguably matches in part the
situation we commented on earlier
for countries like India..
PROTECTIONISM
Since globalization facilitates and accelerates these
trends, there will probably be a backlash against global-
ization and toward protectionism as a way to keep wealth
in the country that produces it instead of transferring
wealth to already wealthy countries.
McKeever now seems to refer to
the position of low-income coun-
tries; but without trying to relate
this point to his earlier comments
about protection for workers in
high-income countries.
 
McKeever presents a quasi-communitarian model: producers in rich Northern
countries (say, farmers) should be protected against international competition, by gov-
ernments which represent and sustain national communities. These governments will
6not represent also the interests of outsiders. Insofar as such interests are reflected
through effective demand in the market, and hence financial rewards for some nation-
als, the governments are still supposed to control markets rather than be controlled by
them, and to represent all nationals, not only those who receive market rewards.
Onora O’Neill has remarked sceptically:
The upsurge of communitarian thinking [in the North] about virtue and (in
small measure) about justice in the 1980s fits oddly with the reality that eco-
nomic and political structures were and are becoming increasingly cosmo-
politan. Might it reflect the fact that cosmopolitan claims are no longer ad-
vantageous to [Northern] elites, as they perhaps were or were though to be in
the recently past era of imperialism? In a post-imperial world, cosmopolitan
arrangements threaten rich states with uncontrolled economic forces and im-
migration and demands for aid for the poor of the world, and autocratic states
with demands that human rights be guaranteed across boundaries. (O’Neill,
1996: 28-9).
With these introductory examples in mind, let us try to build a picture of the
range of viewpoints about global ethics.
3. POSITIONS IN GLOBAL ETHICS: BROADENING OUR VIEW
3.1 Dower’s classification
Nigel Dower’s book on ethics and international relations, World Ethics - The
New Agenda (1998), helpfully characterizes and assesses three normative approaches to
international relations, and compares how they treat a series of broad problem fields.5
1. First, ‘sceptical realism’/’international scepticism’ holds that countries (national
States) overwhelmingly do and should pursue their own (long-term) interests, even
when that involves breaking agreements.
2. Second, ‘internationalism’ and communitarianism hold that, while countries are the
primary units on the world stage, held together internally as established communi-
ties, a community of countries emerges to some degree, for and through regulation
of their interaction and mutual continuation. Within that community a modus
vivendi is established, with agreements which must be respected, just as within
countries. The participants (the national States) remain predominantly ethical na-
tionalists, so that the label ‘inter-nationalism’ fits this case better.6
3. Third come cosmopolitan positions, which hold that all humanity is the reference
group in ethical discussions, some common values apply across humanity, and
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6 The inter-national agreements concern notably: respect for sovereignty; rules of warfare, rules of di-
plomacy, and the very principle of respecting agreements.
7some responsibilities exist towards all humanity. Three major variants are pre-
sented:
• ‘libertarian-minimalism’ [Cosmopolitan.1], in which individuals and their liberties
are all that matter worldwide, not nations/States, which must not interfere with
those liberties;
• ‘idealism-dogmatism’ [Cosmopolitan.2], in which some more extensive set of val-
ues is deemed universally appropriate and to be promoted;
• ‘solidarism-pluralism’ [Cosmopolitan 3], in which global-wide concerns and obli-
gations are emphasized but with large spaces accepted for variation in values and
behaviour between settings. Dower adopts this position, and tries to delink valid
points in communitarianism from its sectarian and relativist variants.
Thus Dower discusses five approaches in all. The classification goes further in charac-
terization and scope than many previous treatments. We will see how it still needs to be
extended.
Of the positions we looked at, McKeever’s could fit communitarianism. In con-
trast, the positions of some Indian emigres, whether mental or physical emigres, might
approximate most to ‘libertarian-minimalism’, and lead us to distinguish two dimen-
sions: the ethical status accorded to national boundaries, and the acceptance or not of
pan-human obligations as opposed to obligations arising out of specific contracts or af-
finities. Using these two dimensions, Dower’s five approaches can be compared and
ordered as in Figure 1
  PAN-HUMAN  VALUES   & RESPONSIBILITIES ?Figure 1: An analysis of Dower's
five-fold classification of
approaches
HIGH LOW
IMPORTANT ‘Solidarist-pluralist’
(Cosmopolitan 3)
‘Inter-nationalist’
Communitarian.
‘International sceptic’
ARE NATIONAL
BOUNDARIES
ETHICALLY
IMPORTANT ?
NOT
IMPORTANT
Full cosmopolitans
(‘idealist-dogmatist’/
‘solidarist-globalist’;
Cosmopolitan 2)
‘Libertarian-minimalist’, e.g.
TNCs without national loyalties
(Cosmopolitan 1)
This suggests how diverse is Dower’s ‘cosmopolitan’ family: it fills three of the four
cells. Positions which meet either of the two criteria seem accepted as cosmopolitan,
8yet the two criteria are very different.7 Let us examine this further.
3.2 Investigating and broadening the classification
Dower’s classification and discussion still seems to reflect an International Re-
lations (IR) tradition. Much of his book is on international scepticism and inter-
nationalism, views standard in the IR discipline. Dower's purpose is indeed to recog-
nize the range of starting points and then seek areas of agreement where different views
can reach a common conclusion even if by different routes. A declared solidarist-
pluralist cosmopolitan, his own views seem a plausible mix of elements drawn from the
strengths of various philosophical traditions, and with an emphasis on priority to ful-
filment of common basic needs, as rationally required for the coherence of each tradi-
tion (including the libertarian). He concludes against strong versions of globalism-
solidarism: ‘World government would only be acceptable when it would become un-
necessary. So let us be good world citizens instead’ (p.196). World citizen here means
member of a global political community that is far less integrated than a state.
The IR-based classification needs to be elaborated. There appear fewer differ-
ences in practice between Dower’s ‘sceptical realists’ and ‘inter-nationalists’ than exist
within his cosmopolitan category. His sceptics about inter-national morality manage to
not also be sceptics about intra-national morality and duties; they too may be commu-
nitarians, intra-nationally. And while the libertarian-minimalists indeed give no special
priority to national boundaries, rather to personal boundaries--they deny having large
responsibilities to almost any others, not only to foreigners--as a result they are far
closer on many international issues to the sceptics and lesser nationalists than to other
cosmopolitans. Dower’s statements about cosmopolitan views do not always hold for
libertarians who deny human solidarity and extensive obligations to others. Further,
some libertarians, zealots for unrestricted world markets, well fit Dower’s label ‘ideal-
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are based only on convention and contract; in type B they derive from a background universal moral the-
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ways similar to Fig. 1 and en route to Fig.3.
Figure 2: A restatement
          of Dower (2001)
SCOPE OF INTER- STATE MORALITY
EXTENSIVE INTERMEDIATE LIMITED
SPECIFIC
AGREEMENTS
‘Inter-nationalist’ ASOURCE OF
MORALITY FOR
INTER-STATE
RELATIONS
UNIVERSAL MORAL
PRINCIPLES
Solidarist-
globalist
‘Inter-
nationalist’ B
9ist-dogmatist cosmopolitan’ even though not the content he attaches to the label. It
seems better to distinguish that content by the separate label ‘solidarist-globalist’.
We need then not only two dimensions of classification -- whether values and
responsibilities of universal scope are accepted or not; and whether or not national
boundaries are considered important -- to adequately capture Dower’s five positions.
We have to specify strong, intermediate and anti- views on each axis. We thereby iden-
tify four more positions, which Figure 3 below marks in italics.
 PAN-HUMAN VALUES  &  RESPONSIBILITIES ? Figure 3: A fuller classification of
viewpoints in global ethics  EXTENSIVE  MODEST/SLIGHT  NONE
 
 VERY
IMPORTANT
 
 1. ‘Scandinavian’ 8  2. ‘Inter-nationalist’  3. ‘International
sceptic’
 
 
 INTERMEDIATE
 IMPORTANCE
4.‘Solidarist-
pluralist’
[Cosmopolitan 3]
 5. TNCs with na-
tional loyal-
ties/priorities, but
some accepted global
duties
 6. Typical
 domestic
 corporation
 
 
 
 ARE
 NATIONAL
 BOUNDARIES
 ETHICALLY
 IMPORTANT ?
 
 NOT IMPORTANT
 7. Full cosmo-
politans
 (solidarist-
globalist)
 [Cosmopolitan 2]
 
 8. ‘Libertarian-
minimalist’,  e.g.
TNCs without
 national loyalties but
with some accepted
necessary global du-
ties
 [Cosmop.1 - 'Soros’]
 9a) Business-only
corporations
 9b) Robber-baron
corporations
 9c) Family & clan
‘corporations’
 (9d) 'L'etranger'
individuals)
 Non-italicized positions = discussed by Dower. Italicized positions = not covered by Dower.
One of the four additions is perhaps typically ‘Scandinavian’ (#1). The other
three are possible business corporation viewpoints (# 5, 6 and 9) other than that of a
pure transnational corporation (TNC) which would follow laws and agreements but
also actively seek to sustain a system of global order (Position 8).
• Position 5 includes corporations which retain a primary national loyalty but also
invest a certain amount in good causes worldwide; for example Ford or various
Japanese TNCs.
• Position 6 includes corporations which have only the primary national loyalty: they
                                                                                                                                 
8. Arguably, all positions in the first row could have communitarian variants. Thus the ‘Scandinavian’
position could be communitarian and give lexical priority to needs at home, while still leaving major
concern for needs abroad. Concern for others, derived from feelings of shared values and sympathy, is
unlikely to suddenly cease at the national boundaries.
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feel some concern to maintain community viability in their home base, not else-
where, but even this can be outweighed by the call of profit.
• Position 9a includes corporations which have no such national loyalty, nor any geo-
graphically wider loyalties other than profit.
• In contrast, Position 8 concerns corporations without national loyalties who yet ac-
cept some need to invest in ‘global services’--the Soros stance--also perhaps to
maintain the credibility of an equal-opportunity liberal ideology. There can be dis-
agreements on the minimum needed to maintain a libertarian system, and thus on
the appropriate meaning of ‘libertarian-minimalism’.
In a fuller-blown sibling of Position 9a the concern for profit and disregard for
national jurisdictions leads to disregard for national laws too: 9b) the ‘robber-baron’
capitalist, ready to buy officials and politicians not only (other) commodities. Position 9
also includes the cases we saw earlier: individuals or groups estranged from national
loyalties (9c and 9d). The individual could even be estranged from almost any human
loyalties, like Camus’s “L’Etranger”, a European colonist who casually kills an Arab
(barely recognized as such) in French Algeria. We will consider later (at the end of
Section III) how far these Darwinian positions, the robber-baron and l’etranger, deserve
to be called global ethics. L’etranger as colonialist (as currently in Israel, Brazil, and
many other locations), or even immigrant, continues as a major player worldwide.
Clearly identifiable as an ethic with worldwide obligations are the values of the family,
lineage or clan which is spread across two or more countries and operates to provide
mutual support. A hybrid case that could deserve separate attention are the criminal ma-
fias, which combine ‘robber-baron’ predation, ‘family’ bonds, disregard for national
bounds, and routine killing. In the terms of Figure 3’s extension of Figure 1, Position 9
might be called ‘post-liberal’; but historically speaking it seems ‘pre-liberal’ too. The
proliferation of variants of Position 9 suggests that one might later further refine the
classification dimensions and labels.
Figure 3 already suffices for some important findings. Note first the distribution
of attention across the various viewpoints.
• Dower's classification (covering the non-italicized positions) is stronger in attention
to the bottom-left to top-right diagonal in Figure 3. For it may assume a strong cor-
relation between positions in the two dimensions: that low ethical importance given
to national boundaries will conduce to acceptance of values and responsibilities
11
with global scope, and vice versa. That assumption may well be becoming out-
moded (again). Positions along the top-left to bottom-right diagonal need major at-
tention too.
• Since States consider national boundaries (very) important, IR (Inter-National Re-
lations) discourse has concentrated on positions like 2, 3 and 4, though with posi-
tion 7 as an idealist counterpart or outpost which shared the same belief in a corre-
lation.
• Positions in the bottom right of the diagram -- nos. 8 and 9 -- are growing in par-
ticular. They hold that national boundaries are not ethically important, but that there
are few or no responsibilities with global scope.
We can see secondly the value of multiple criteria in classification. Using two
dimensions lets us see the ambiguity in the term ‘cosmopolitan’. Even the five positions
covered by Dower are hard to fit into a single low-to-high sequence (is #2 more cos-
mopolitan than #8 or vice versa ?). Cosmopolitanism in one respect (low weight to na-
tional boundaries) can be combined with extreme parochialism in the other (non-
interest in foreigners). Position 9 is thus more comprehensively sceptical than the ‘in-
ternational sceptic’ position 3. It rejects national loyalties as well as trans-national pan-
human ones.
Thirdly we see the need for dimensional analysis, not just binary contrasts. The
gaps only emerge to view when we introduce intermediate positions. With only a 2x2
classification, Dower's set of schools may seem to have covered the range, as in Figure
1 above. But if one feels uncomfortable at grouping together inter-nationalists and in-
ternational sceptics one is led on to a profounder map of the universe of discourse.
A similar concern arises when one reads Charles Gore’s insightful picture of
major positions and trends in development policy analysis (Gore, 1996; Gore, 2000).
The types of global ethic contained in his final column are very varied (Figure 4 be-
low). If we use Dower’s terms we might describe the ‘Washington Consensus’ as lib-
ertarian-minimalist: it is cosmopolitan in the sense that there is only one moral domain,
but there are minimal international obligations, just as there are minimal domestic obli-
gations. UNDP’s Sustainable Human Development School is closer to a ‘pluralist-
solidarist’ stance, or in its stronger variants to ‘globalism-solidarism’.
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NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
Figure 4: Gore on paradigms
in development policy
analysis National Global
EXPLANATORY
National
Competing mainstream
development paradigms pre-
1982, e.g. balanced v. unbal-
anced growth
1. Dominant development para-
digm post-1982 (labelled as
‘Washington Consensus’)
2. 1990s Sustainable Human
Development
 FRAMEWORK Global
Counter-currents pre-1982 (Latin
American structuralism &
dependency theory).
East Asian models.
Latin American neostructuralism
Predicted paradigm shift
Thus it makes a great difference for Gore’s predicted paradigm shift which of
those cosmopolitan ethics will be the future ‘global normative framework’, and whether
the shift into the bottom-right quadrant comes from the bottom-left or top-right. One
fears the emergence of perspectives based on a sophisticated global framework for ex-
planation and a consistently selfish, but global, normative framework.
We could go further in elaborating Dower’s classification.
• One might change the definition of cosmopolitan, so that it no longer spans two di-
mensions. One would then use 'cosmopolitan' simply to mean acceptance of the
world as in important respects one moral domain (‘cosmos' as a ‘polis')9, across
which members have some obligations and rights; ‘solidaristic’ for views in which
such obligations and rights are relatively extensive; ‘pluralistic' for respect for a
plurality of ways of life and conceptions of good/right; and ‘universalistic' for
views that certain values should be respected world-wide for and by all. Robber
barons can be universalist in asserting that the same values hold good everywhere,
but non-solidaristic in rejecting any extensive content to such values, any extensive
obligations.
• We might perhaps add a second dimension in the question ‘values and responsibili-
ties with global scope?’: to distinguish between these types of commitment: 1. pan-
human, 2. worldwide but restricted to some types of person (e.g. from one’s race or
lineage or other network), 3. internal to the national political unit.10
                                                
9 According to the Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy, polites = citizen, and cosmopolitanism is the doc-
trine that we are citizens of a world.community.
10 One would similarly try to include Erskine’s ‘embedded cosmopolitanism’, where an inclusive ethic
can arise because individuals are simultaneously members of many, overlapping, non-territorial, morally
constitutive communities.
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• We might seek to add other dimensions, for example concerning the level of agents
considered: state-corporation-ethne-clan/family-individual.
There will be no perfect classification. We have enough refinement already,
with one exception, to put several insights to effective use. We need first however to
consolidate and extend our analysis of the ‘liberal-minimalist’ position (Cos. 1).
4. THE ETHICS OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
ON LIFE-STYLE CONSUMERS AND MARKET BIRDS OF PREY
We saw that the ‘libertarian-minimalist’ category appears underanalysed in
Dower’s classification and deserves fuller investigation. It contains importantly differ-
ent variants and siblings; and further, to put its form of cosmopolitanism -- the cos-
mopolitanism of free trade areas rather than of liberal politics or direct promotion of
positive freedom -- together with the others can be misleading. Let us examine this
category and its variants further.
4.1 Libertarian minimalism and the crises of global warming and AIDS
Fujiwara (2001) observes that the clash between the US and most of the rest of
the world in the greenhouse gas discussions is a clash of frames and doctrines as well as
a clash of material interests. I suggest that the US is in effect applying a market moral-
ity, or mentality, in the climate change discussions. (There seems little need in this case
to disaggregate ‘the US’ and distinguish between the government and the major corpo-
rations.) Damage to others need not be culpable in a market framework, if not produced
by direct assault or breach of a law. In fact the doctrine of competition, a central legiti-
mating motor of the market mechanism, demands that one try to inflict damage on
competitors and indirectly on their employees and suppliers. After long denial of the
damage, actual and impending, inflicted on others as a result of its high-gas lifestyle
(twice the per capita greenhouse gas emissions of the European Union), the no longer
credibly deniable damage can instead be defined away. As with a corporation found to
be polluting a common resource and hence indirectly damaging others, the defence of-
fered is that no one has property rights over the common resource. Therefore those who
have broken no law and who only indirectly and unknowingly may have harmed others
are judged as non blame-able (‘blame’ originally means ‘to speak ill of’); and within a
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defensive individualistic world-view, no blame means no responsibility.11 Only when
Americans perceive global warming as of direct major harm to them is change in their
stance probable. Possibly corporate America’s world-wide interests will help such an
evolution eventually.
In a parallel case, there has not been dispute over the large direct benefits that
would arise from wider access to patented anti-AIDS drugs in the South, by low-cost
supply from Southern companies. The patent-holding Northern pharmaceutical corpo-
rations have for years sought to block that access since they perceive it as at the cost of
their profits and argue that the profits (which apparently are not distributed) serve the
long-run benefit of all by funding research. When one considers the scale of the health
disaster and societal disaster already begun across much of Africa, and the scale of the
corporations’ past and ongoing profits and dividends, such future profit projections
could be shortsighted as well as obscene. But no exceptions were to be made - profit
has been rigorously defended. If an exception were made in this case, and need put be-
fore projected profit, where would such argumentation stop? - nowhere short of dicta-
torship, has run the market mantra. Further, profit must be distributed to shareholders,
and managers, otherwise a corporation risks being taken-over. The corporations refer in
addition to market doctrine about rights of possession and about the long run superior-
ity for all (compared to the alternatives) of the market system. It seems unlikely though
that they would maintain the same stance if the people dying were in the heart of
Europe or America, rather than Africa. Further in the North the gap between corporate
profit needs and impoverished patients’ life needs would largely be bridged by gov-
ernment. Possibly Northern government aid will eventually belatedly help to bridge the
gap in or for Africa. How such aid will be labelled will be interesting and important.
Through the 1980s and 1990s most Northern governments' aid budgets declined
steadily as a proportion of national income and public expenditure. Per capita aid for
Africans fell by 40% through the 1990s. It is worth examining the attacks on aid in the
1980s for further insight into libertarian-minimalism, as well as into other viewpoints in
global ethics.
                                                
11 On this world-view in the work of Hayek, see Gasper (1986), Section 5: Absolutization of Just Proc-
ess.
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4.2 Aid ethics: return of the stranger12
The question 'Has international aid to poorer countries the right to exist at all?'
was kept on the agenda through the 1960s and 1970s by a small number of Right-wing
theorists antagonistic to aid, such as Peter Bauer, and became a major focus in the
1980s and 1990s.13 The following set of viewpoints indicates most of the spectrum.
1. An obligation exists, the same as intra-nationally: International aid is seen as mor-
ally identical to resource transfers to poorer regions, groups or individuals within
national boundaries (and the domestic transfers are considered legitimate and desir-
able). A set of positions exists here, according to the perceived moral basis for in-
tra-national transfers (whether needs, utility, rights, historical debt or connections,
or whatever). Sometimes it is held that aid should consequently be organised in a
similar way to domestic transfers, routinised and with little space for discretion, as
one part of welfare policy. But factual constraints differ in the international case
and might profoundly affect and limit how and how far the rich can help. These po-
sitions match Dower's solidarist cosmopolitan categories. He argues that globalist-
solidarist and pluralist-solidarist positions are divided not on the degree of com-
mitment to help, but on how we should help. One suspects though that pluralism-
solidarism is liable in practice to give some priority to domestic clients, for example
by placing a heavier burden of proof on foreign aid.
2. Lesser obligation: International aid is considered a moral obligation upon richer
countries, groups and individuals, but subject to certain major conditions (for ex-
ample about its urgency and potential efficacy; or about the existence of past and
present North-South links), and is in general accorded lesser priority than obliga-
tions closer to home. This position may match Dower’s inter-nationalist B category,
(Figure 2 above). It partly fits Scandinavia and the Netherlands, the donors who
bind themselves to and implement a substantial target level of support; even if view
3, aid as charity, has influenced the manner in which they give.
3. Charity: International aid is beyond obligation -- so while to give it is an act of su-
perogatory virtue and may be commendable, not giving it cannot be condemned.
Thus the former Soviet bloc held that it had no historical links with and hence no
present obligations to give aid to the South. In contrast, the work of development-
                                                
12 This section builds on Gasper (1999: 29-31).
13 See Riddell (1987) Gasper (1986, 1994), and Opeskin (1996) for surveys of the debate.
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oriented foundations such as Rockefeller and Ford, and Ted Turner’s immense (al-
beit tax-reducing) donation to the U.N., can reflect a stance of benevolent charity.
4. My country first and only: aid to people in other countries is a betrayal of co-
community members at ‘home’ who have unsatisfied needs and/or other claims --
except when international aid furthers their interests better than would domestic
uses. This position largely matches Dower's communitarian and ‘international
sceptic’ categories (e.g. Bauer, 1961). It influences some governmental aid, though
not (one assumes) NGDO aid.
5. A matter solely for individuals to decide: Charity may be commendable, and na-
tional boundaries insignificant, but individual self-ownership makes both intra- and
inter-national obligatory (i.e. tax-derived) transfers immoral. This is the implication
of the influential possessive-individualist philosophy of Robert Nozick (1974), pre-
sented for consideration in development policy by Deepak Lal (1976.) Tax-based
aid provided by a donor government is deemed illegitimate, unlike voluntary trans-
national aid from individuals. This position matches some variants of Dower's lib-
ertarian-minimalist category. The view that foreign transfers by a national govern-
ment are illegitimate was long followed by for example Switzerland.14
6. Morally indifferent: whether a person or group of persons (e.g. an organisation)
chooses to help others, either in their country or another, is considered an entirely
optional consumer matter. To do so is no better or worse than any other (legal) use
of their wealth. Charity is not commendable. This position matches a less humanis-
tic variant in Dower's libertarian-minimalist category. Foreign aid as a morally in-
different life-style option might be how most corporations view their tightfisted-
ness.
7. Culturally relative: here the ‘consumer’, the entity that adopts life-style options, is
an entire culture. Some cultures are ‘into’ helping others, others are not, and, it is
claimed in this viewpoint, there are no defensible ways of saying one value position
is better than the other. This more casual ‘post-modern’ stance differs from the na-
tionalist viewpoint -- which certainly believes that its own position is better than
others -- but readily coexists with it. This position too matches Dower's communi-
tarian category in part.
                                                
14 Switzerland is home too to the amoral or Darwinian Swiss banks and the genuinely charitable Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross, an international affairs committee with exclusively Swiss member-
ship. ‘International’ refers to the Darwinian mess in the world outside.
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Views 3, 5, 6 and 7 might be under-highlighted in Dower's typology: that inter-
national aid is purely superogatory, charity; or that inter-national aid is illegitimate, ex-
tra-national transfers being a matter only for individuals to decide; or that such deci-
sions are purely the whim of a particular consumer or culture, and are 'beyond good and
evil'. Many positions are merged under Dower's libertarian-minimalist and internation-
alist versus communitarian categories. In practice many composite forms indeed ap-
pear, but for analytical clarity we must distinguish their heterogenous parts.
All of views 3 through 7 seem widespread in the USA, including amongst pow-
erful Republican politicians. International scepticism is of course prominent, and many
a Hollywood movie burnishes the myths associated with View 4’s ‘my country first and
only’. A generation back, in the early days of the American New Right backlash, Sum-
berg (1973:60) ‘looked for...without finding [any] duty laid upon us. There is no such
duty... [Aid] is purely discretionary’, even in emergencies and--according to him--even
inside a nation. Typically in such views, attempted aid through governments is seen as
pernicious too: a channelling of rewards via the ignorant and corruption-prone to the
incompetent and work-shy.
4.3 ‘Libertarian-minimalism’: theories and practices
We can now consolidate certain key distinctions required within Dower's 'lib-
ertarian-minimalist' category.
• Libertarian humanist positions. Some positions here reject any distinction accord-
ing to group or nation.and declare respect for all individuals, who are to be as far as
possible unconstrained (so far as consistent with equal freedom for others).
• Libertarian anti-humanist positions: legal market power. In practice, however, the
overwhelmingly most important operationalization of 'libertarian-minimalist' con-
ceptions is through power in the market, and this leads in a dramatically different
direction. Individuals are weighted in proportion to financial strength. Individuals
without purchasing power are ignored. Billionaires are big. The market is world-
wide, presided over now by the World Trade Organization, an entity differently ti-
tled from the bodies of the United Nations like the International Labour Office. As
we saw in the anti-AIDS drugs case, money-power’s forms of cosmopolitanism and
universalism are very different, and anti-humanist, even though sometimes legiti-
mized by use of libertarian humanist discourse. While these market-based ethics
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formally centre on claims of providing fair process, their political viability may rest
as much on the theory that market operation does in the long run benefit all, at least
as compared to the benefits from the real alternatives.
• Libertarian anti-humanist positions: market power converted into lawless socio-
political power and immunity. In principle, markets operate with respect for laws
established at both national and, increasingly predominant, international levels. In
practice, however some market operators systematically evade and subvert both na-
tional and international rules. ‘Minimalism’ applies for the proclaimed limits to
their obligations, not for the scope of their own interventions.
For decades, traders from all over Europe have flocked to this lakeside Alpine
town [Zug], attracted by stringent privacy laws, low tax rates and guarantees
of corporate anonymity. But no one has achieved the dominance of Marc
Rich, the billionaire metals dealer… [famous for] the business practices cited
in his 1983 indictment of racketeering by the Southern District of New York -
- trading with pariah states [e.g. as the leading supplier of oil to apartheid
South Africa], manipulating the market for huge personal gain [e.g. cornering
the international aluminium market in the early 1990s], hiding profits in a
thicket of offshore companies…. While [Rich and his partner] denied wrong-
doing and refused to produce documents relating to the [1983] case, they
ended up paying $200 million in back taxes and penalties in partial settle-
ment…
"There is a lawless quality about the way he operates", Mr. Weinberg [prose-
cutor in the 1983 case] said. "He will do whatever he needs to do to close a
deal."
"He sees himself as a citizen of the world, unencumbered by the laws of sov-
ereign nations", said Howard Safir, a former U.S. marshal…
(International Herald Tribune, 14 March 2001; italics added)
Is this a global ethic? We would still need to consider Mr. Rich and his ilk even
if it were not, as an analytically interesting and historically important outlier, in a dis-
cussion of world ethics. Using Nigel Dower’s definition though (cited at the start of this
paper), Rich’s “My Way” could arguably constitute a system of ideas concerning the
ethical obligations of human beings, individually or in groups, in their relations with
individuals and groups throughout the world.  But it would be a Darwinian15 or
Nietzschean perfectionist ethic, in which unlimited contestation is claimed as the route
to maximization of  some prioritized  excellence or qualities.16 It supports the extension
                                                
15 Or rather, evolutionary; for what defines Darwinism is not fully clear. Inheritance of acquired charac-
teristics is Lamarckean rather than Darwinian (Blackwell’s Dictionary of Human Geography).
16 In Rawls’s sense, perfectionism in ethics holds that we should maximize excellence in art, science and
culture (The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy). Thomas Hurka defines it as promoting the expression
and fulfilment of those features which are deemed to make humans human - e.g. for Aristotle rationality,
for Marx productive activity, or for Nietzsche the exercise of the will to power (Hurka, 1993:3). Hurka
discusses Nietzsche’s views at length as a form of perfectionism, notably the principle of maximizing the
quality of a minority of the best individuals.
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of money power and market struggle to all matters: if one can buy aluminium, why not
voters, politicians, judges, legislators, regulators,...even lives? The advocated rules ap-
ply universally and equally to all, to the strong and the weak. All are allowed to sleep
under bridges, as Anatole France remarked; and the super-rich from anywhere are wel-
come in Zug.
5. CONCLUSION: FROM INTERNATIONALISM TO GLOBALISM-
LOCALISM-INDIVIDUALISM-FAMILISM-CORPORATISM - THE
NECESSITY OF BETTER DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS
I have suggested the following points.
1. Global ethics as a field of study and practice needs to pay considerable attention not
only to bodies of published prescriptive doctrine. It must examine intently the ethics
implicit in practice.
2. It must in particular move beyond the state-centred perspectives and taxonomy of
doctrines inherited from the academic field of International Relations. It must attend
to agents other than the state; and it must not assume that views which accord low
(/high) normative importance to national boundaries correlate strongly with views
which grant high (/low) weight to the normative claims of people beyond those
boundaries. Many 'national elites' and other upwardly mobile groups seem de facto
to reject both national and international moral community, except insofar as other
people's claims are heard through markets.
3. Normative IR and global ethics therefore must recognise and study positions which
give neither national boundaries nor global pan-human obligations much ethical
importance (Position 9 in Table 3 above), the ‘neither-nor’ positions. These posi-
tions take individuals or groups as the relevant units, rather than nations, and do not
revolve around debates advocating or denying duties between nations. It is not ap-
propriate to group these views together, as ‘cosmopolitan’, with other views which
also deny the moral priority of national boundaries.
4. Since the label ‘cosmopolitan’ has ambigously spanned those two dimensions--(i)
whether or not values and responsibilities of universal scope are accepted; and (ii)
whether or not national boundaries are considered normatively important--we could
reserve 'cosmopolitan' for acceptance of the world as in important respects one
moral domain, across which members have some obligations and rights; and use
‘solidaristic’ for views in which such obligations and rights are relatively extensive.
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5. Within dimension (i), we must further distinguish whether global commitments, if
accepted, are: 1. pan-human or 2. worldwide but restricted to some types of person
(e.g. from one’s race or lineage). In the second case, the rejection of national moral
community and pursuit of advancement on a global stage by many aspirant groups
is often buttressed by the social capital and morality of their groups and networks of
kin and region, in some cases with their own functional equivalents of an interna-
tional income tax. Communitarianism is alive and thriving at a global scale.
6. The ‘neither-nor positions’ seem relatively neglected in IR discourse. Position 9 in
fact covers several varieties, not all well described as ‘libertarian-minimalist’. We
noted: 9a) the business-only market agent, which pursues only profit but within the
law; 9b) the ‘robber-baron’ market agent, which pursues only profit, basta, and may
use a Darwinian-Nietzschean perfectionist ethic; 9c): the ‘family corporation’, op-
erating communally on a world scale; and 9d): the individual estranged from na-
tional and even active communal affiliations, perhaps pursuing some personal life-
project while or through working for the global corporations and consuming their
products.
7. Relatedly, the ‘libertarian-minimalist’ ethic deserves closer attention and subdivi-
sion. (Table 3 distinguishes at least four positions: 5, 6, 8 and 9a, not one.) The
formal libertarian-minimalist ethics referred to in IR literature arguably do not
cover the reality of business-only practice (Position 9a). As a body of doctrine a
libertarian-minimalist ethic is likely to present itself as strongly concerned with in-
dividuals and their freedom (e.g. Nozick, 1974) and thus with ensuring the neces-
sary preconditions for such freedom (Position 8). In business-only practice, how-
ever, liberal doctrine becomes operationalized through market calculations which
weight people by purchasing power and ignore those who have none. Our analysis
of aid ethics shows further relevant divisions, notably concerning whether aid is
seen as commendable even if not obligatory. We need more than a single ‘libertar-
ian-minimalist’ category.
8. The relative analytic neglect of ‘neither-nor’ positions and some variants of liber-
tarian thought are major substantive omissions for understanding the contemporary
world. Market theology is rampant, as seen for example in the climate change dis-
cussions and in attempts by drugs companies to have their familiar level of profit
override the needs of AIDS sufferers. And the theology of Position 8 diverges from
the usual practice of Position 9a, where only money talks in the market and big
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money has a megaphone; let alone from Position 9b, where all of life becomes a
market. Amongst ‘neither nationalist nor solidarist’ positions are some which are
not humanist too.
9. We gain from a complex classification of views, with explicit dimensions of com-
parison and more than binary contrasts in each dimension. The main classification
scheme used in this paper (Table 3 above) proves helpful, but we are already
straining at its limits and further refinement might be worthwhile. Applications are
vital, however, to make the distinctions more vivid, communicable, and demonstra-
bly worthwhile, and to deepen our awareness before attempting much more taxon-
omy.
My main purpose has been descriptive rather than predictive or directly pre-
scriptive: to provide better categories and ways of thinking about categorization, as a
prelude to more detailed description. In support of that project, I have argued that the
‘neither nationalist nor solidarist’ positions, including anti-humanist variants, are mas-
sive, even central, and growing. They must be recognized and studied.
As to prediction, I would note only that there are multiple trends, including
some which clash or provoke their opposite, as both McKeever and O’Neill observed.
Some hope for an ethical backlash against possessive individualism, and claim that
pressure for corporate social responsibility has led to most corporations now genuinely
accepting some wider obligations. Dower offers a valuable critique and broadening of
‘us-here-now’ moralities and comments on alternative ethics of sustainable develop-
ment. ‘[The] more radical agenda is not a call for self-sacrifice, [but] it may involve a
re-evaluation of what is important in our lives... We...need to fundamentally re-evaluate
our idea of well-being and thus the idea of development... Part of my moral optimism in
the face of a world that invites pessimism resides in the view that doing what we ought
can be self-affirming rather than self-denying’ (Dower, 1998:196). He hopes that en-
lightened self- interest too leads to cosmopolitan conclusions. The ‘we’, his main audi-
ence, are the well-off in the North. But more attention is needed to the constitution of
the ‘us’, ‘we’, and ‘self’ in post-modern consumerism. Cohesive national communities,
bound by social contracts within clear national containers, judiciously if sceptically
pursuing some interpretation of their group interest in the world arena, cannot be pre-
sumed. We have to revise and extend our categories as we move from normative inter-
national relations to global ethics.
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